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I. JUNK BONDS AND THEIR ROLE AS PART OF A
LARGER SCHEME IN INNOVATIVE CORPORATE ACQUI-
SITION FINANCING
A. Introduction-Increase in Corporate Takeovers
The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the unsoli-
cited tender offer as an important weapon in the acquisition of
corporate control.' With this increase has come a notable trend
toward "doing bigger and better deals ' 2 sometimes involving targets
that are significantly larger and that have far greater capital than
the acquiring corporation. 3 Transactions now involve billions, instead
of millions of dollars. 4 Accordingly, a need has developed to raise
1. Greene, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, SEc. L.
REv. 297, 300 (1985). In 1960 there were eight tender offers to acquire control of corporations
with securities listed on national exchanges. By 1966 the number had increased to more than
100. In 1981 there were 123 such tender offers, and in 1982, 92 were reported. Id. at 300,
n.3; see also, H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CONG. & ADIANr. NEws 2811, 2812.
2. For example, these mergers occurred in the 1980s: 1984, Gulf/Chevron ($13.3 billion);
1984, Getty/Texaco ($10.1) 1981, Conoco/DuPont ($7.4); 1982, Marathon Oil/U.S. Steel
($6.7); 1984, Superior Oil/Mobil ($5.8); 1985, General Foods/Phillip Morris ($5.8). Wall St.J.,
Jan. 2, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
3. Id.
4. See, supra note 2 (examples of mergers over a billion dollars include Mesa/Unocal,
GAF/Union Carbide, Pantry Pride/Revlon).
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large amounts of cash quickly. In response, raiders5 and others are
continually developing new innovative financing techniques 6 equal to
the challenge. One device is popularly known as the "junk bond."
A "junk bond" is a debt security sold to sophisticated private
investors, who, unlike banks, brokers, and dealers, are not tradition-
ally regulated by the Federal margin. The junk bond allows acqui-
sitions to be financed by raiders with a limited capital investment.
As a result, many have perceived an increase in corporate takeovers
financed by junk bonds. A new interpretive regulation by the Federal
Reserve would place junk bond financing under the Federal margin
rules used to regulate banks, brokers and dealers.7
B. Junk Bond Financing Prior to Federal Reserve Regulation
Prior to the new Federal Reserve regulation 207.112,8 a raider who
had accumulated stock in a target, 9 but did not have the capacity to
finance an entire acquisition on its own, could raise capital to finance
the prospective tender offer through the sale of high yield, non-
investment grade securities, also known as "junk bonds." This type
of financing is exemplified by the Mesa/Unocal transaction which is
used as an illustration for the new regulation. The technique consists
of a tender offer made through a shell corporation capitalized through
the sale of junk bonds.'0
5. The term "raider" signifies a concept of relative meaning. Some have used the term
to create fear; attributing to it a boogie-man quality and suggesting the corporate raider as
the individual newly designated to hide in the closets of corporate boardrooms: "Today there
are those individuals in our financial community who seek to reduce our proudest businesses
into nothing but corporate shells. They seize control of the corporation with unknown resources,
sell or trade away the best assets, and later split up the remains among themselves." 113
CONG. REc. 857-58 (1967) (statement of Senator Kuchel).
Others view corporate acquisitions as a natural economic reaction to various market forces,
including valuation and quality of management. As used in the context of this article, the
term "raider" is intended solely as a colorful substitute for the acquiring corporation.
6. Wray and Veilleux, Innovative Corporate Financing Techniques, 48 Corp. Prac.
Series (BNA) (1986).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g-h. (West 1982, Supp. 1985).
8. 51 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1986) (codified at 2 C.F.R. § 207.112) (purchase of debt securities
to finance corporate takeovers).
9. Typically, this accumulation will stop short of 5% in order to delay application of
the Williams Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1) (West 1982).
10. Regulation section 207.112 provides two examples illustrating the types of tender
offers subject to regulation. The Federal Reserve emphasizes the fact that these examples refer
to the Mesa/Unocal and Pantry Pride/Revlon tender offers, respectively. Fed. Res. Bd. Release
5-6 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The illustration relating to Mesa/
Unocal follows:
(b) In the first situation, the acquiring company, Company A, controls a shell
corporation that would make a tender offer for the stock of Company B, which is
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
The junk bonds are issued by a shell corporation, having no assets
or business functions, but which serves as an investment vehicle for
the takeover attempt. Because the shell has no assets, the bonds are
unsecured. However, the risk is made acceptable to the investor
primarily by a high interest rate and, to a lesser degree, handsome
commitment fees as well as promises by the issuer to effect shelf
registration." The securities are sold to sophisticated investors in
large denominations through private placements. 12 No equity is in-
volved; therefore, from the perspective of the issuer, junk bond
financing is preferable because it leaves a larger share of control and
profit in the issuer's hands.
13
In this manner the raider has been able to raise, at an early stage,
all the money needed to finance the tender offer. The advantages
over other financing methods were twofold. First, the raider was not
"at risk" for any of the amounts raised. Secondly, in contrast to a
margin transaction, the raider was not limited to raising an amount
which he could match by his own collateral. This resulted in the
ability to finance extremely large takeovers. This development led
some to question whether takeovers have been made too easy, es-
pecially those on a large scale. 14 Certainly it has led management to
margin stock (as defined in section 207.2(i)). The shell corporation has virtually no
operations, has no significant business function other than to acquire, and hold the
stock of Company B, and has substantially no assets other than the margin stock
to be acquired. To finance the tender offer, the shell corporation would issue debt
securities which, by their terms, would be unsecured. If the tender offer is successful,
the shell corporation would seek to merge with Company B. However, the tender
offer seeks to acquire fewer shares of Company B than is necessary under state law
to effect a "short form" merger with Company B, which could be consummated
without the approval of shareholders or the board of directors of Company B.
Id.
11. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(b) (1986). M. LIPTON AND E. STEINBEROER, TAKEOVERS AND
FR.EzouTs, § 1.0418] (1987) [hereinafter, LipToN]. Shelf registration makes the securities more
freely transferable, hence more valuable in the hands of the holder. Id. The topic is developed
more fully in later portions of the text.
12. L. Solomon, Corporate Acquisitions, Mergers and Divestitures (P-H) 72,259 (1983)
[hereinafter Solomon]. See infra text accompanying note 53.
13. Corporate Acquisition Ideas (P-H) at 1 (August 1986).
14. The SEC's Office of the Chief Economist has completed a study which found that
although there are pronounced trends toward the use of junk bonds to finance takeovers, the
absolute level of junk bond financing is less than what many believed. The study did confirm,
however, that junk bonds are used most often in hostile takeover attempts.
According to the OCE, from 1981 to 1984 the most popular form of tender offer financing
continued to be bank borrowing (78.6%), followed by internal funds and equity financing
(21.1%). During those same years debt financing accounted for only 0.3% of financing ($200
million out of $65 billion). The OCE found a changing trend during the first half of 1985,
however. During this period junk bonds accounted for 13.6% of financing ($2 billion out of
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put pressure on Congress and the regulatory agencies to curb tak-
eovers in general. 15
II. THE FEDERAL RESERVES ANTI-TAKEOVER
REGULATION: 12 C.F.R. SECTION 207.112
In response to petitions by entrenched management at Unocal Cor-
poration and Revlon Incorporated, the Federal Reserve promulgated
a regulation which, on its face, purports to change the previous
regulatory scheme by bringing the Mesa/Unocal type financing trans-
action within the ambit of the Federal margin rules.' 6 In essence, the
Federal Reserve accomplishes this result by considering these investors
to be "lenders" and considering debt securities issued by a shell
corporation to be "indirectly secured" by the stock of the target
company and thus subject to the margin rules.1 7 With this change,
$14.7 billion).
Junk bond financing increased as the size of the offer increased. From October 1984
through July 1985, researchers found that junk bonds accounted for none of the 30 smallest
offers, 0.6% of the 30 median-sized offers, and 32.9% of the 30 largest offers. See Corporate
Acquisition Ideas, (P-H) at 6 (Sept. 1986); see also Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1986-87 Transfer
Binder] 84,011 (Junk Bond Study).
15. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1986, at 6, col. 1; see also Fed. Res. Bd. 5 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on
file at the Pacific Law Journal).
16. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g-h (West 1982, Supp. 1985). One commentator explains margin
trading thusly:
The word "margin" has been judicially defined as collateral or security used in
connection with the purchase of securities. Ordinarily, margin is considered to be
the amount deposited by a purchaser of stock with his broker, being a certain
percentage of the purchase price of the stock involved, the broker agreeing to
advance the balance of the purchase price upon the condition that he be entitled to
hold the stock purchased as security for his advance.
Trading on margin is normally accomplished by one of two methods. Using the
first method, an investor will deposit a percentage of the purchase price with his
broker in a margin account and the broker will lend the investor the remainder of
the purchase price. The broker will then retain the purchased stock as collateral....
The amount deposited by the investor at the time of purchase is the "initial margin"
and the amount which must be maintained in accordance with a percentage of the
market value is the "maintenance margin." Using the second method, an investor
will borrow directly from a bank, finance company or other lender with no formal
margin account being established.
Wolfson, Regulation of Brokers, Dealers, and Securities Markets, 9.01, n.1 (1977) (citing
Kelley & Webb, Credit and Securities: The Margin Requirements, 24 Bus. L. 1153-54 (1969)).
If not subject to the margin rules, the raider's takeover capacity is limited only by the
amount of debt he is able to raise. Under the new rule, the raider must be able to raise from
other sources at least 50% of the funds to serve as margin security. See 12 C.F.R. § 207.112
(1986). Cf. infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
17. Regulation section 207.112 provides in relevant part:
(c) The purchase of the debt securities issued by the shell corporation to finance the
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junk bond investors are limited by the margin rules to financing only
fifty percent of the tender offer. The remaining fifty percent must
be put up, in cash, by the shell corporation as security on the loan. 8
Under the new interpretation, the utility of junk bond financing has
potentially been diminished where the tender offeror can not raise
an equivalent amount of capital to that which was raised through
the sale of junk bonds. If successful the burden would be most
pronounced in very large tender offers, since as the size of the debt
offering increases so too does the amount of money which must be
independently raised by the tender offeror.
The Reagan administration, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and the Justice Department have expressed doubts regarding
the validity of this new interpretation of Regulation G. The Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice have
intimated that the new amendment is an indirect regulation of hostile
takeovers which in practical effect benefits only the largest corpo-
rations. 19 As such, the regulation raises serious legal and policy issues
as to whether it exceeds the congressional grant of authority to
regulate margin transactions.20
A. The Federal Margin Restrictions
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sets out the basic
statutory guidelines for margin regulation. The purpose of the statute
is to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchase and carrying
of securities. 21 The Act prescribes the margin percentages that ex-
change members, brokers and dealers may extend for the purchase
of securities.22 Currently the Federal Reserve Board has set the margin
rate at approximately fifty percent.2 Section 7(d) of the Exchange
acquisition clearly involves "purpose credit" (as defined in section 207.2(1)).
In addition, such debt securities would be purchased only by sophisticated
investors in very large minimum denominations, so that the purchase may be
"lenders" for purposes of Regulation G. Sec. 12 C.F.R. 207.2(h). Since the debt
securities contain no direct security agreement involving the margin stock, applica-
bility of the lending restrictions of the Regulation turn on whether the arrangement
constitutes an extension of credit that is secured indirectly by margin stock.
12 C.F.R. 207.112(c) (1986).
18. Solomon, supra note 12, at 77,470.3; see also Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 32
(Oct. 1, 1986).
19. See. Reg. & L. (BNA), at 18 (March 3, 1986); see also Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
[1986-87 Transfer Binder] 84,011 (Junk Bond Study).
20. Id.
21. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a) (West 1982, Supp. 1985).
22. Id. § 78g(b) (vest 1982).
23. Id. § 78g(a)(1) (Vest 1982).
1988 / Junk Bond Financing
Act additionally authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to adopt
similar provisions regarding the extension of credit by persons other
than exchange members, brokers and dealers when the credit is
extended for the purpose of purchasing securities. 24
B. Regulation G
The Federal Reserve is authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 78w to create such
regulations as are "necessary or appropriate" to implement the
provisions of section 7. Regulation G is one such rule.
Regulation G extends the margin requirements to "lenders (other
than exchange members, brokers, and dealers) who, in the ordinary
course of their business, extend or maintain, ... any credit for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying any margin security, if such credit
is secured directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by collateral that
includes any margin security."' ' Once Regulation G applies, no lender
falling within its parameters may extend or arrange for credit to
purchase securities in an amount exceeding fifty percent of the
purchase, or as determined by the lender in good faith.26 Typically,
Regulation G has been applied to "mainstream" credit institutions
such as banks. Prior to section 207.112, Regulation G had not been
expanded to include individual investors purchasing junk bonds.
In concluding that the issuance of junk bonds by a shell corporation
is properly regulated under the Federal margin rules, the Federal
Reserve Board must have made the following conclusions: (1) that
junk bond financing involves the type of credit transaction intended
by Congress to be regulated under the margin rules; and, (2) that
given the nature of the security, sophistication of the purchaser, and
the junk bond market in general, an investor could reasonably expect
his investment to be indirectly secured by the stock of the target
corporation.
This article examines the validity, application, and scope of Federal
Reserve regulation section 207.112, amending Regulation G to pro-
hibit a shell corporation from debt financing more than fifty percent
of a hostile corporate takeover. To this end, consideration will first
be given to the general application and rationale behind the federal
margin requirements. Secondly, the amendment itself will be exam-
ined to determine its specific limitations. Finally, consideration will
24. See § 78g(d) (West 1982).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(b) (1982) (Purpose and Scope).
26. Solomon, supra note 12, at 77,470.3.
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be given to developing ways around the regulation, and the innovative
reactions of the securities industry in developing alternatives which
do not conflict with the new regulation.
III. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
REGULATION
A. Background and Legislative History
1. Pre-margin Regulation Abuses
In the early 1930's, Congress, and a large portion of the rest of
the United States, was of the belief that a major cause of the 1929
stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression was excessive
speculation in securities on credit. 27 Prior to the enactment of section
7 of the Exchange Act, an investor with little or no collateral could
obtain a large position in margin securities on credit arranged by a
broker or third party lender. At any one time, the aggregate amount
of credit extended to the market would vary with the volume of
margin transactions. Given a fixed money supply, and the fact that
the same lenders serviced both the securities market and mainstream
loans to businesses, the system was thought to result in less money
available for commercial loans and higher interest rates. A slight
market downturn resulted in a significant impairment of bank secu-
rity.28
2. Legislative History
Both the statute and the legislative history make it clear that the
margin rules were enacted primarily "for the purpose of preventing
excessive use of credit in purchasing and carrying securities." '29 A
review of the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress was
much less concerned with the individual than with the credit market
as a whole.3 0
27. S. JAFFE, BRoKERs, DEALERs AND SEcununms MARKETS, 327 (1977). This is so even
though commentators have disagreed as to the ultimate cause. Id. (citing GALBrPA TH, TIM
GREAT CRASH OF 1929, 174 (1954)).
28. S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1934) (Stock Exchange Practices).
29. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a) (West 1982).
30. See id. This is not to say that there was no concern with investor protection but it is
apparent that investor protection was not a dominant force. To this effect was a statement
by Chairman Rayburn of the House Commerce Committee: "A reasonably high margin
requirement is essential so that a person cannot get into the market on a shoestring one day
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Because the Federal Reserve Board's regulating authority is circum-
scribed by this statutory delegation of power, the new regulation
raises two basic questions. The first involves determining whether
the word "credit" is all-inclusive, or whether some differentiation
between types of lenders is required. The second question relates to
which creditors Congress intended to regulate, or whether all creditors
were intended to be equally regulated in light of the purposes of the
Exchange Act.
Congress seems to have been fairly explicit in its determination
that not all credit transactions bear a relationship to the particular
abuses to which the margin rules are addressed. The House Reports
are particularly clear in addressing this point:
The underlying theory of the bill with respect to credit is as follows:
(1) Without adequate control the too strong attraction of a specu-
lative stock market for credit prevents a balanced utilization of the
nation's credit resources in commerce, industry, and agriculture;
(2) To effect such better balance, all speculative credit should be
subjected to the central control of the Federal Reserve Board...;
(3) To achieve that control, the Federal Reserve Board should be
vested with the most effectual and direct power over speculative
credit, i.e., the power to control margins on the actual ultimate
loans themselves. 3'
The House Report then delineates the purposes which it desired to
be achieved by the margin rules:
The main purpose of these margin provisions ... is not to increase
the safety of security loans for lenders. Banks and brokers normally
require sufficient collateral to make themselves safe without the
help of law. Nor is the main purpose even the protection of the
small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself
too thinly-although such a result will be achieved as a by-product
of the main purpose.
The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an effective
method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit
and be one of the sheared lambs when he wakes up in the morning." 78 CoNo. Rc. 7700,
8 (1934).
In contrast is a statement by Thomas Cochran, principal draftsman of the Exchange Act:
"One [purpose] is to protect the lamb. Another, and probably the more important of the two,
although it does not appeal to one's human instinct as completely, is a protection of the
National Business System from the fluctuations that are induced by fluctuations in the market,
which in turn stems back to this very exquisite liquidity you get when you have a lot of
borrowed money in the market. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, 73d Cong. 2d Sess.
6994 (1934) (statement of Thomas Cochran).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
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resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock market
and out of more desirable uses of commerce and industry-to
prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash situation where funds which
would otherwise have been available at normal interest rates for
uses of local commerce, industry, and agriculture, were drained by
far higher rates into security loans and the New York call mar-
ket. ..32
In light of this, Congress concluded that:
When margins are discussed with this main purpose in mind,
differences between the collateral value of gilt-edged bonds and
speculative stocks, the credit-worthiness of particular borrowers and
similar considerations which have been urged as reasons why each
loan should be treated as a particular problem in itself-consider-
ations which affect not a general national credit policy, but only
the safety of a particular stock transaction from the standpoint of
a particular lender and particular borrower-are unimportant.33
Thus, it is clear that the speculative nature of a particular issue was
only intended to be regulated to the extent it impaired the national
mainstream credit market.
3. Ultra Vires
In light of this policy, an examination of the credit and junk bond
markets should illustrate that because of the bonds' nature and the
market's definition, these rationales do not apply to the present
regulation. The issuance of junk bonds neither affects the availability
of credit to commerce and industry nor does it affect interest rates.
Thus, the question is raised as to whether the Federal Reserve has
acted ultra vires as has been intimated by the Justice Department
and the Securities Exchange Commission.3 4
In concluding that junk bond investors who buy in large minimum
denominations are "lenders, ' 35 the Federal Reserve assumes that all
credit available either for junk bond purchases or for use in commerce
and industry is drawn from the same "pool" of credit, and that it
is equally available for either purpose. In fact this is not the case.
Two different capital markets are involved, normal business capital
and risk capital. These two capital markets are composed of two
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. (emphasis added); but see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 19; see also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(h); 207.112 (1986). See also id. § 207.3(a) (1982) (provides for
registration).
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distinct types of lenders, the "risk averse" lender and the "risk
taker."3 6
The junk bond market is composed of "risk takers," investors
who are looking to invest only in speculative ventures which because
of the higher degree of risk will yield a greater rate of return, i.e.,
a greater "risk premium." To the extent that these investors are
seeking maximum return from their capital, the risk taker's funds
are simply not available to the commercial or industrial borrower
who will not pay more for the use of the risk taker's funds than for
a commercial bank loan. Conversely, because the normal commercial
loan venture is not "risky" enough for the borrower to justify the
high interest which must be paid for the use of the risk taker's funds,
the commercial borrower would not wish to borrow money from the
risk taker.3
7
Bankers, brokers, and dealers on the other hand are "risk averse"
lenders. They will not normally wish to engage in risky transactions,
and in fact are precluded from doing .so by statute.38 Consequently,
because of the lesser degree of risk, the cost of capital is relatively
low in the commercial loan market when compared to the risk capital
market. The "consumer" in this market would tend to be a relatively
low risk, long range, and growth oriented commercial borrower, who
is unwilling to pay an unnecessary risk premium.
3 9
From this it follows that junk bond financing should cause neither
more nor less credit to be available for commercial and industrial
purposes. Since Congress intended only to regulate mainstream lend-
ers on whom commerce and industry depend for affordably priced
capital, it makes little sense for the Federal Reserve to regulate junk
bond purchasers as "lenders" simply because debt securities are
purchased in large denominations. To the extent that the risk capital
market does not overlap with the mainstream commercial lending
market, there is no diversion of mainstream credit and Federal
36. STEVENSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 243 (1981).
37. Id.
38. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1945, Supp. 1987) (corporate powers of associations); 12
C.F.R. § 1.3(b) (1982) (defining "investment security"); see also CAL. FIN. CODE § 1335 (West
1977) (authorized investments), 1369 (vest 1977) (legal investments of savings banks). Both
state and federal law restrict a bank's purchase of securities to investment grade securities,
excluding investments which are predominately speculative in nature. Junk bonds are non-
investment grade securities and, consequently, an improper portfolio item for such institutions.
See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
39. STaVENSON, FuNDAimNTALS OF INvasmENTs 243 (1981).
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Reserve interference is improper. Thus, the justification proffered by
the Federal Reserve is, at best, tenuous.
For similar reasons it does not seem likely that junk bond financing
would have an appreciable effect on interest rates. First, the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury exert greater direct control over interest
rates through their power to-control the money supply and regulation
of T-Bill sales, respectively, than do private market forces. Secondly,
if it is assumed that interest also is a function of market demand
for credit, then it must also be assumed that there exist two distinct
capital markets. From this it follows that there are two independent
demand curves, which again leads to the conclusion that the activities
in the junk bond market would have no direct effect on interest rates
for mainstream credit. 40
B. "Indirectly Secured" by Margin Stock
Notwithstanding the regulation's inadequacy from a purely theo-
retical and policy perspective, fault may also be found with the
conclusion that the bonds are indirectly secured by the margin stock
of the target company. A loan is indirectly secured when the bor-
rower's right or ability to dispose of the margin stock owned by the
customer is in any way restricted while the credit remains outstand-
ing.4' However, the loan is not indirectly unsecured where the lender
has not relied upon the margin stock as collateral in extending or
maintaining the credit. 42
The position taken by the Board of Governors is that historically
"the Board has recognized 'indirect security' can encompass a wide
variety of arrangements ... where lenders do not have a conventional
direct security interest in the colateral." 43 The citation provided by
the Board in support of this statement refers to a situation where
loans were made to an investment company for purchase of securities
to hold as part of its business. 44 This reference only muddies already
murky water.
40. Without support from either of these two rationales, it may be contended that the
Federal Reserve regulation is ultra vires. While this may prove true in theory, the practical
difficulty is in hurdling the administrative law barriers, which are beyond the scope of this
topic. It might also be noted that an interpretive ruling is an important, but nonbinding agency
opinion of how a statute should be viewed. Thus, on review, an interpretive ruling is much
more subject to attack on its underlying principles. 3 MMEzns, An~smIsiRA='E LAW, § 15.07[3]
(1977).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(f) (1987).
42. Id. § 207.2(f)(2)(iv) (1987); see also id. § 207.112 (1987).
43. Id. § 207.112(d) (1987).
44. 5 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULAMo N 3276 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
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A review of one commentator's work45 indicates that the Federal
Reserve conclusion on this point would be explainable where the
lending institution was a broker, dealer or bank since the question
of whether the lender has in good faith not relied upon margin stock
is necessarily one of fact. 46 While it would be inconsistent for a risk
averse lender, such as a bank, to lend money without security to rely
upon, such a result would be entirely consistent with a lower interest
rate reflecting less risk in the case of a secured loan to the investment
company. The high interest rates paid on junk bonds, on the other
hand, are indicia of complete lack of security, direct or indirect, and
therefore the same conclusion is not warranted in the case of junk
bond financing.
The Federal Reserve's position on this issue ignores the fact that
when an investor is a risk taker, it is completely consistent, even
necessary, that he not rely upon margin stock as security given the
risk premium offered in exchange for accepting unsecured debt. The
key feature of the junk bond is in its high degree of risk and superior
long term yield. 47 Because of this, and in light of the highly sophis-
ticated nature of the investor, it seems particularly anomolous for
the Federal Reserve to take the position that the risk premium
involved in a junk bond transaction is not due to the lack of security.
This is, after all, why the securities are called "junk" bonds.
1. Technical Description of the Junk Bond Market
A technical description of the junk bond market is an integral part
of the facts and circumstances which indicate that an investor may
in good faith not rely upon the margin stock as indirect security.
Junk bonds are high yield, fixed income debt securities which are
rated below investment grade, 48 although the particular characteristics
of the bond are not invariable.
49
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing 54 Fed. Res. Bull. 439 (1968)).
47. 11 LoRN, ACQUISITIONS AND MEROERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS,
§ 6.05[4] (1985) [hereinafter, LORNE]; Phillips, High-Yield Securities, Seventeenth Annual Institute
on Securities Regulation, 85 (Prac. L. Inst. 1986) [hereinafter, Friedman]. This volume examines
the full panoply of issues which may arise in a hostile takeover scenario. Written by, and for,
investment bankers it presents a detailed and complex analysis of the area.
48. Friedman, supra note 47, at 71.
49. Variations on this scheme may include variable rates, exchangeability options, detach-
able warrants or other "equity kickers." LIPTON, supra note 11, at § 1.04[8]. See also Friedman,
supra note 47, at 72.
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Generally, the bonds are sold in minimum denominations of
$1 million or more. The noninvestment grade status results from the
fact that the bonds are unsecured and would be subordinate to
hypothetical equity interests; there would also be no cause of action
on the part of the holder in the event of default. As a result, junk
bonds receive a rating from Standard & Poors of BB+ or lower,
and a rating from Moody's of Bal or lower. 0 Among other things this
noninvestment grade status, by statute, precludes junk bonds from
being a proper investment for some banks.5' Since junk bonds are
unsecured, it stands to reason that the investors must be primarily
interested in the quality and potential of management and the high
yield, not the security provisions of the borrowing agreement.5 2 With
respect to the foregoing, two additional points regarding the sophis-
tication of the investor and the performance of the bonds, are
significant.
2. The Junk Bond Investor
The high yield bond market has attracted extremely competent and
sophisticated investors, even apart from their willingness to accept
risk. One survey 3 indicates that approximtely 90%-95% of the pur-
chasers of junk bonds are large institutional investors.5 4 Less than
10% of the remaining purchasers are individuals. 5 Of these investors,
all possess the requisite financial acumen and net worth to qualify
for private placement and, presumably, the ability (either themselves
or through their representatives) to understand the relationship be-
tween unsecured debt, risk, and the rate of return.
3. Superior Historical Rates of Return
It should now be clear that the nonrecourse nature of the debt is
deemed acceptable by the sophisticated investor in light of the at-
tractive rate of return. Over the last ten years junk bonds have
enjoyed a cumulative rate of return of almost 250% compared to
Fixed Income Funds (175%), Standard & Poors 500 (117%), and the
50. Friedman, supra note 42, at 72.
51. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that there are
two distinct credit markets).
52. Friedman, supra note 47, at 72.
53. Id. at 83.
54. Id. (Insurance Companies and Pension Funds (65-70%); High Yield Mutual Funds
(20%); Savings Institutions (10%); Individuals and Foreign Investors (less than 10%)).
55. Id.
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Dow Jones Industrial Average (61%). 56 This is so notwithstanding
the fact that the default rate of junk bonds (1.6%) is 16 times that
of investment grade securities (.01%).11 Over 95% of this total return
on a bond which has a 14% coupon and a twenty year life is provided
by the payment and reinvestment of interest, not the return of prin-
cipal." Thus, the analysis of the junk bond payout indicates that return
of principal and security is merely a secondary consideration to the
investor because of the extraordinary rate of return."
What little authority there is on this point6° at the present time
has concluded that the situation has been taken out of context. First,
given the sophisticated nature of the purchasers and their ability to
assess and diversify risk, it would appear highly unlikely that they
could reasonably look to anything other than the rate of return when
buying the junk bonds. When presented with this argument, however,
the Federal Reserve claimed it was unsupported by the introduction
of evidence. 61 Instead the Federal Reserve found, without convincing
analysis, that there must have been at least partial reliance upon the
margin stock. 62 This conclusion is unwarranted since it completely
ignores the separate capital markets, the concept of the risk/return
trade-off63 and the lack of legal recourse in the event of default by
the issuer.64
Secondly, the principal purpose of raising funds from the sale of
junk bonds is to acquire companies, not investment positions. The
bidders' intent, invariably, is to cause the securities to cease being
traded at all. 65 Placed back into the context of a hostile takeover
attempt, margin securities are not, therefore, the source to which the
lenders are looking for repayment. They are looking to the assets
and earning power of the historically undervalued target company. 6
56. Id. A detailed financial analysis supporting the superior performance of junk bonds
is beyond the scope of this article. The point to be emphasized is that from this performance,
regulation by the Federal Reserve Board does not seem justified. Even if it were justified,
other agencies are better suited to regulate in this area.
57. Id.
58. Id. (explaining the wider spread).
59. Id. at 85; see also Fed. Res. Bd. Release 35 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific
Law Jour nal).
60. LoRwa, supra note 47, at § 6.05[4].
61. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 35 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at Pacific Law Journal).
62. BORDEAX, BAsic THEoR Y oF CoaRoRaT FINANcE 328 (1977).
63. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
64. LoRNE, supra note 47, at § 6.05[4]; Friedman, supra note 42, at 85.
65. LoitNE, supra note 47, at § 6.05[4].
66. Id.
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The Federal Reserve's interpretive regulation, reflecting its belief that
junk bond purchasers do rely on margin stock as collateral, does not
accurately reflect these underlying considerations.
IV. THE OUTER LIMITS OF JUNK BOND REGULATION
The outer limits of junk bond regulation are circumscribed by self-
imposed limitations by the Federal Reserve Board, and efforts by
the securities industry to circumvent the Board's regulation.
A. Self-imposed Limitations
In effect, the Federal Reserve's regulation is limited in coverage
to large-scale hostile takeover financing schemes involving shell cor-
porations without significant assets and business functions, and with-
out a guaranty from a parent company or other entity. Specifically,
in purporting to limit the regulation to clarifying "indirect security"
in the Mesa/Unocal type transaction (and thereby causing the margin
rules to apply), the regulation sets forth four "safe harbor" trans-
actions in which an investor could in good faith extend credit without
looking at the margin stock for security.6 7
1. Agreed Upon ("Friendly") Mergers and Statutory ("Short
Form") Mergers
The margin restrictions will not apply to debt financing of either
"friendly" acquisitions or "short form" mergers. 68 Of the four
limitations, the exclusion of these two transactions appears to be
more a matter of theoretical completeness than practical utility.
Part of the Federal Reserve's justification in concluding that the
junk bond purchases were indirectly secured appeared in the finding
by the Reserve Board that because of potential defensive measures
by the target company, the margin stock must be retained by the
raider for a "significant and indefinite" period of time depending
upon which defensive measures are utilized and to what degree.69 In
the Federal Reserve's view this constitutes a "practical" restriction
on the ability to dispose of collateral, hence the transaction is
67. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 16 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(f) (1987).
69. Id.
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indirectly secured by the target's stock.70 Where there is an agreement
to merge, however, there would presumably be no defensive tactics
and, according to the Federal Reserve, no restriction upon disposi-
tion. However, in order to rely on this provision the merger agreement
must have been concluded, at the latest, by the time the funds are
advanced.
71
For similar reasons the short form merger is excluded from oper-
ation of the regulation. The short form merger exemption is even
more limited than the exclusion for friendly mergers. First, it only
applies where the tender offeror could obtain the statutorily required
percentage of shares, up to 90% in some states. 72 Secondly, because
of the high percentage of shares required to effect a short form
merger, this exemption is almost certainly limited to small or mid-
sized companies and would not work well for large tender offers.
73
2. Operating Companies With Substantial Assets
Debt securities will not be subject to margin requirements when
the issuer is an operating company with substantial non-margin
stock assets or cash flow. 74 The Pantry Pride/Revlon transaction
demonstrates the basic scenario for this safe harbor exclusion. Section
207.112(h) uses the Pantry Pride tender offer as an illustration for
this type of exclusion:
(h) In the second situation, Company C, an operating company
with substantial assets or cash flow, seeks to acquire Company D,
which is significantly larger than Company C. Company C estab-
lishes a shell corporation that together with Company C makes a
tender offer for the shares of Company D, which is margin stock.
To finance the tender offer, the shell corporation would obtain a
bank loan which complies with the margin lending restrictions of
Regulation U. Company C would issue debt securities that would
not be directly secured by any margin stock.
70. Id.; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,011.35; Loss, supra note 45, at 770 n.52. The point
is, of course, debatable. As enacted the regulation applies to a transaction where "disposal of
the security is in any manner restricted." (emphasis added) 12 C.F.R. § 207.112() (1985). Here
the Federal Reserve views a "practical restriction" as one of the prescribed ways disposition
may be restricted. This is erroneous. For the most part a raider is free to sell the security-
either back to the company, or to another person.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(f) (1987); see also Fed. Res. Bd. Release 21 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on
file at the Pacific Law Journal).
72. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1110 (West 1977, Supp. 1988) (90%); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253 (1974) (90%); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney 1983) (90%).
73. For example, the Mesa or GAF tender offers.
74. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(0 (1987); Fed. Res. Bd. Release 16 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
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The Board is of the opinion that these debt securities would not
be indirectly secured by any margin stock of Company D since, as
an operating business Company C has substantial assets or cash flow
without regard to the margin stock of Company D.
The rationale of the Board of Governors in excluding the Pantry
Pride type transaction is that since the junk bonds are issued by a
company with a history of ongoing business operations, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that lenders are relying on margin stock
of the target company, and not other assets, as the source of
repayment. 75 Although the Federal Reserve continues in its reasoning
to ignore the indicia of completely unsecured debt 76 the position taken
by the Federal Reserve on this point softens the impact on the junk
bond market by narrowing the definition of "shell corporation" to
encompass only shells which do not have substantial assets and
genuine business operations.
The question remains unanswered by the preceding example as to
what figures will constitute "substantial assets or cash flow." Because
the Federal Reserve has referred specifically to tender offers by Pantry
Pride and the GAF Corporation, some indications of specific para-
meters are available. Unfortunately, they are unofficial. 77
Pantry Pride/Revlon is the first example. Pantry Pride was an
operating company with existing non-margin assets of approximately
$400 million, net worth of $145 million,78 and annual income of only
$110 million.79 Revlon, on the other hand, was a $2.4 billion com-
pany.80
Revlon petitioned the Federal Reserve objecting that the $840
million sought to be raised by Pantry Pride could not be supported
by their existing assets. This petition was later withdrawn before the
Federal Reserve could comment. However, in a later release" the
Federal Reserve Board commented that a debt/book value ratio of
2:1, based upon the Pantry Pride figures, was thought to be sufficient
75. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 18 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
77. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 6-7 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journao.
78. Id.
79. Wall St.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 46, col. 2.
80. Id. The relevant portion of the article reads: "The Fed said that Pantry Pride, part
owned by MacAndrews, was not a shell even though it had just $10 million in annual revenue
when it acquired Revlon, which had $2.4 billion." Id.
81. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 7, 19 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). It
is not clear as to the relative weight each figure is given. It is assumed that the primary
figure would be asset value, given the concern for security.
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assets to avoid the margin rules. Lower ratios, illustrated by the
GAF/Union Carbide transaction in the next section, have also been
held to be sufficient. 82
3. Guarantees by Companies with Substantial Assets or Cash
Flow
For the same reasons, a junk bond purchaser may, in good faith,
not rely upon the margin stock of the target when the bonds are
guaranteed by a company with substantial non-margin assets or cash
flow."3 As an illustration the Federal Reserve cites the GAF/Union
Carbide tender offer., 4 GAF intended to control a shell acquisition
vehicle issuing debt securities totalling $2.3 billion guaranteed by
GAF. In this instance, GAF's total assets and shareholders equity
was $1.2 billion. This represented a ratio of 1.92:1, which the Federal
Reserve stated was adequate.
s5
A comparison of the Pantry Pride and GAP tender offers indicates
that, at least for the time, a debt to asset ratio of as low as 1.92:1
would be acceptable to the Federal Reserve in avoiding application
of the margin rules.
B. Exceptions and Industry Alternatives
The self-imposed limitations placed upon the regulation by the
Federal Reserve may prove inadequate in certain situations. For
example, in a very large tender offer by a very small company, it is
likely that at some point the ratio of debt to security will climb to
an unacceptable level. It is also possible that the potential risk
involved would make giving a guarantee impractical. Furthermore,
the quasi-safeharbor provisions of the preceding section are still
somewhat uncertain and subject to change. Consequently, this section
develops suggestions intended to facilitate junk bond financing with-
out conflict with regulation section 207.112.
1. "Little Takeovers"
The federal margin rules do not apply when the target company's
stock is not "margin" stock. s6 "Margin Stock" is not uniformly
82. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
83. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(h) (1987).
84. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 6, 19 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
85. Id. Further inquiry might be made into what comparable standards of assets to debt
are required by industry lenders.
86. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,011.35; Loss, supra note 45, at 720 n.52.
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defined. For Regulation G purposes regulation 207.2(i) defines "mar-
gin stock" to mean any registered equity security, OTC margin stock,
National Market System security, debt convertible into margin stock,
option or warrant to subscribe to margin stock, and certain registered
Investment Company Act Securities. 87 The purchase of privately held
companies which are not traded over the counter and are not listed
on the Board's periodically published list of OTC Margin Stocks are
not margin stock and are not inhibited by the regulation.8" Thus, it
is at least theoretically possible to finance one hundred percent of
such takeovers through the sale of junk bonds.
Junk bond financing for takeovers of companies with non-margin
stock is not desirable however. The practical reality is that if a
security is not traded over the counter the company is probably too
small to justify the cost of junk bond financing. Another reason is
that due to the absence of a public market the acquisition of non-
margin shares could not be accomplished feasibly by means of a
conventional tender offer. Such a transaction, if completed, would
have more characteristics of a "mugging" than a hostile takeover.
2. Publicly Offered Debt.Securities
The margin rules do not apply to securities purchased with funds
obtained through the sale of publicly offered debt securities.8 9 How-
ever, as originally proposed, regulation 207.112 did not differentiate
between junk bond sales made by the usual private placement and
those made through a public offering. 90 The Federal Reserve's official
policy behind this change of position was that purchasers on the
secondary market may not have access to the disclosure statements
and thus may not be aware that the proceeds from sale of debt
securities would be subject to the margin rules.91
Another, and perhaps more substantial, criticism of the new inter-
pretation by the Federal Reserve is that it is contrary to the widely
different goals of the federal margin rules established by the 1934
87. Id.
88. Under the Exchange Act of 1934, a company is not eligible to be traded over the
counter unless it is a section 12 reporting company (15 U.S.C. § 781 (1972)). Registration under
section 12(g)(1)(B) is required when there are more than 500 shareholders and assets in excess
of $5 million. Registration is discretionary in other cases. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(l)(B) (Section
12 of the Exchange Act of 1934).
89. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 25 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
90. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
91. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 25 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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Exchange Act, and the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities
Act.12 Whereas, the primary purpose of the margin rules is the
protection of the national credit market, 93 the goal of imposing
registration under section 5 of the Securities Act is to insure adequate
information in the market regarding the issuer. Since the operative
registration and liability sections of the Securities Act 94 contemplates
a "disclosure system" rather than a "merit system," it would seem
that once an issue complied with the registration requirements of the
1933 Act, junk bonds should be subject to no further protective
provisions relating to the soundness of the offering. The investor has
had adequate information disclosed to him before placing his funds
at risk.
According to the Federal Reserve, the proposal as originally con-
ceived was directed at the nominal type of public offering utilized in
the Pantry Pride/Revlon transaction. 95 Pantry Pride had registered
the securities with the SEC as a public offering, but sold the securities
in minimum denominations of $2.5 million so that the transaction
resembled a private placement. 96 In declining to finally adopt the
position that public and private offerings would both be subject to
the margin rules, the Board also provided a somewhat ominous
caveat. For the purposes of applying the margin requirements, prior
staff decisions which stated that publicly offered debt securities are
not subject to margin regulations were premised upon the assumption
that these were bona fide -public offerings. 91 In light of the federal
policy behind the securities laws, this caveat by the Federal Reserve
seems unwarranted.
Although it is unclear as to whether the Federal Reserve will
ultimately have the authority to subject publicly issued debt securities
to the margin requirements, the Board claims to have found support
for this position in one case. 98 For the time being however, the Board
92. These goals were not addressed by the Federal Reserve Board.
93. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 24 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). A by-
product of the margin rules provided for the protection of the investors. See supra note 30
and accompanying text.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982) (Section 5 of the 1933 Act, registration); 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1982) (Section 11 of 1933 Act, civil liabilities on account of false registration statement); 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (Section 12 of 1933 Act, civil liabilities arising in connection with prospectuses
and communications).
95. Fed. Res. Bd. Release 24-25 (Jan. 10, 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
96. Id.
97. Id. "
98. Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride No. 85-497 Slip op. at 22-24 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 1985).
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is content to place the matter under consideration to be dealt with
in the context of a formal amendment to Regulation G.
3. Securities Industry Adaptations
The securities and corporate finance industry has always been very
quick to adapt. In January of 1986, when the Board of Governors
voted 3 to 2 to adopt the new interpretation, some supporters hailed
the regulation as "shutting the door on hostile, junk bond takeov-
ers." 99 Others forecasted a substantial disruption of the market. 10'
At that time the Justice Department stated that the proposal would
lead to higher costs for acquiring firms; unequal treatment of com-
petitors for corporate control; decreased market efficiencies for cor-
porate control; and losses for shareholders of both acquiring and
target firms.' 0'
In August of 1986, seven months following the effective date of
the interpretation, securities industry specialists were merely incon-
venienced by the Federal Reserve's interpretation. Some had gone so
far as to say that the Federal Reserve's Rule has "no effect" on
financing hostile takeovers. 1'2
In adapting to the change in regulatory climate, one response has
been to issue half each of equity and debt. 103 The equity however is
a special type of "boutique" or "designer" stock; stock which looks
and acts like debt, but counts as equity. When a merger agreement
is reached, most of the equity stock can be converted into debt.' 4
The "equity" portion of the capital funds the fifty percent margin
requirement, thus satisfying the regulation.
Another response has been to avoid regulation section 207.112
entirely by not using a shell corporation at all. Most deals do not
utilize shell corporations in any event. 05 This approach would be
especially appropriate where "designer" equity stock is issued and
which, by its terms, forecloses a right to bring a claim in the event
of default.
99. Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
100. Id.
101. Fed. Sec. & Corp. Dev. (BNA) at 3 (Jan. 3, 1986).
102. Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 46, col. 2.
103. Corporate Acquisition Ideas (P-H), at & (Sept. 1986).
104. Id. Conversion is facilitated by the better investment terms of debt over the equity
instruments.
105. Wall St- J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 42, col. 2.
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Where it is desirable to use a shell corporation, a variety of
approaches have been adopted to meet the "substantial assets or
cash flow" and "significant business functions" requirements. First,
an acquiring corporation may utilize one of its smaller subsidiaries
to serve as the shell company. Alternatively, another approach utilized
by some firms, such as Triangle Industries and MacAndrews &
Forbes, has been to keep small companies at the ready for use as
shell corporations in leveraged acquisitions. 06
V. CONCLUSION
Federal Reserve regulation section 207.112 has not had the impact
upon financing hostile corporate acquisitions which was feared at its
inception. By limiting the application of the regulation to shell
corporations without substantial assets and significant business func-
tions, the Federal Reserve has foreclosed but one particular type of
junk bond financing. Thus, if the Mesa/Unocal takeover attempt
were to recur, subject to Regulation G, it could not take the same
form, but it would occur nonetheless. Without the use of a shell
corporation, issuance of "designer" equity stock would accomplish
the same result. Alternatively, it would not be difficult to find a
small operating subsidiary to serve, consistently with the new regu-
lation, as the acquisition vehicle. Even assuming that investor pro-
tection was a legitimate and desirable objective of the margin rules,
neither the equity investors nor the junk bond purchasers will have
gained anything by the Federal Reserve's new interpretation, since
the issuer and the purchaser remain free to agree that the investment
is without recourse upon default. The same should be true where
debt securities are sold through a public offering, despite warnings
by the Federal Reserve to the contrary.
Notwithstanding the existence of financing alternatives, problems
remain both from a statutory and an economic perspective. As
envisioned, the Federal margin rules were designed to prevent the
excessive diversion of credit, otherwise available for the Nation's
commercial, industrial, and agricultural growth. As applied, however,
the Federal Reserve's authority is being directed against a capital
market which, unlike mainstream commercial banking and lending
institutions, has nothing to do with the purpose. Moreover, from an
investment analysis perspective, the concept of indirectly securing the
106. Id.
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sale of junk bonds, especially in the context of a hostile takeover,
is completely antithetical to the risk/return tradeoff. In light of this,
perhaps the best approach would be to challenge the interpretive
regulation as ultra vires.
At best, these inconsistencies in the new regulation give it the
qualities of an anomaly. Two inseverable components create the
essence of a junk bond: high risk and high yield. To the exent that
one is a function of the other, a change to the unsecured nature of
the junk bond, without a corresponding expectation of changes in
the investment return, is completely irreconcilable. At worst, because
innovative financing techniques already exist to circumvent the prob-
lem entirely, the regulation may be, for all practical purposes, irrel-
evant.
